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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impact of social-network connections to 
politicians on firm value. We focus on the networks of university classmates and 
alumni among directors of U.S. public firms and congressmen. Using the 
Regression Discontinuity Design based on close elections from 2000 to 2008, we 
identify that a director’s connection to an elected congressman causes a Weighted 
Average Treatment Effect on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of -2.65% 
surrounding the election date. The effect is robust and consistent through various 
specifications, parametric and nonparametric, with different outcome measures 
and social network definitions, and across many subsamples. We find evidence to 
support the hypothesis that firms benefit more when connected politicians 
remain in state politics than when they move to federal office. Overall, our study 
identifies the value of political connections through social networks and uncovers 
its variation across different states and between state and federal political 
environments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The impact of political connections on firms has attracted a growing body of economic 
and finance literature. Political connections are reported to affect firm value, access to credit, 
business with government, corporate taxation, and regulatory oversight, potentially distorting 
incentives in politics and markets in many parts of the world (see Fisman 2001, Johnson and 
Mitton 2003, Khwaja and Mian 2005, Faccio 2006, Faccio et al. 2006, Bertrand et al. 2008, 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 2009, among others). In the United States, the evidence 
of the value of political connections is mixed, with positive estimates (Jayachandran 2006, Knight 
2007, Goldman et al. 2009), as well as estimates equal to zero (Fisman et al. 2006). 
In spite of numerous significant results, strong and convincing empirical evidence on the 
impact of political connections remains scant. One potential explanation is the endogenous 
nature of political connections, which prevents the precise identification and quantification of 
their impact. In addition, the existing literature’s focus on direct links between firms and 
politicians (based on a politician’s ownership, directorship, or management positions in firms) 
raises questions about the generalizability of the results, particularly in the U.S., where these 
direct links are relatively rare. Few papers study the broader political connections from a social 
network perspective, or address the questions of if and why these connections are important. 
In this paper we study the impact of political connections in the U.S., where, purportedly, 
institutions rank among the best, and the line between politics and business is the clearest. We 
broaden the definition of political connections by following a social network approach to define 
links between politicians and corporate directors in non-contractual social relations based on 
their educational backgrounds. We propose an empirical strategy using the Regression 
Discontinuity Design of close elections to overcome three major challenges in any investigation 
of the social network of politicians and directors. Our empirical strategy addresses several major 
challenges. 
The first challenge is the measurement of connections in a social network. 1  While 
connections could be carefully measured by coordination games in laboratory setups (e.g., Leider 
et al. 2009) or by extensive field surveys (e.g., Conley and Udry 2010), both methods are 
                                                 
1 See the surveys on social networks by Marsden (1990), Rauch (2001), Ioannides and Loury (2004), 
Jackson (2009), and Allen and Babus (2009) for more network definitions and measurements. 
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prohibitively costly to apply in our context. Instead, we focus on the social network of former 
classmates and alumni, as proposed by Bertrand et al. (2008), Cohen et al. (2008), and Nguyen 
(2011). This network can be clearly and unambiguously defined based on publicly available 
information on educational backgrounds of all politicians and directors, and is expected to 
strongly predict true friendship in real life. Moving beyond specific connections of certain 
politicians, this network’s coverage is broad enough to be representative of the population of 
politicians and directors, making it possible to generalize the empirical results. 
The second major challenge is the identification problem related to politicians and firms. 
Many unobservable characteristics of politicians and firms can influence a political link (or the 
measure thereof) and the outcomes at the same time, thereby confounding any effect we want to 
attribute to social network connections. In specific contexts, event studies using arguably 
exogenous news and event probabilities from prediction markets may provide partial solutions to 
this issue (see, for instance, Snowberg et al. 2007, or Fisman 2001). However, as we will argue in 
the next section, the answer to the political connection identification problem remains elusive. 
In this paper, we propose a novel approach: we identify the effect of social connections 
of politicians and directors by using close elections of the politicians. Lee (2008) showed that 
close elections can be considered a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), a natural 
experiment that produces near-randomized-trial identification with extremely good internal 
validity. That is, a connection to a politician elected to office by a small margin is nearly identical 
to a connection to one defeated by a small margin, and can be considered as a randomized 
experiment around the threshold. Moreover, Lee and Lemieux (2010) also show that the 
estimated effect is a Weighted Average Treatment Effect (WATE), thus being generalizable to 
the sample of all politicians with a nonzero chance of experiencing a close election. While this 
empirical design has been widely used in labor, political, and development economics (see Lee 
and Lemieux 2010), its application in corporate finance has unfortunately been limited to a 
handful of papers (exceptions include Chava and Roberts 2008, , Cuñat et al. 2010, Kerr et al. 
2010). 
The remaining challenge is the identification of social networks, or the confoundedness 
of homophily. Coined by sociologists,2  “homophily” refers to the phenomenon that people 
sharing the same characteristics are more likely to join the same network, thus confounding the 
                                                 
2 See McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001). 
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effect of connections with the effect of shared characteristics. Earlier works using the social 
network of educational backgrounds (Cohen et al. 2008, Fracassi 2009) have distinguished 
between former classmate networks and alumni networks to highlight the effect of connections 
as opposed to that of shared characteristics. By including both politicians and directors, we are 
able to push this methodology further: we introduce school fixed effects, thus identifying the 
effect of political connections by variations over time (school fixed effects are unidentifiable in 
earlier works based solely on the connections of businessmen). We can thus ascertain that the 
discovered effects come from social connections, not homophily. 
We obtain data on elections from 2000 to 2008 from the Federal Election Commission, 
from which we filter in only elections of a winning margin within 5% between the two 
frontrunners. We manually collect details of all politicians’ educational backgrounds from the 
web archives of their campaigns, a process made difficult by the search for less prominent 
defeated candidates. On the director side, we obtain past education history for directors of 
public firms in the U.S. from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. We then form all 
pairs between close-election candidates (elected or defeated) and directors who graduated from 
the same educational institution (same campus) within one year of each other,3 and link each pair 
to the stock performance of the firm around the date of the politician’s close election. Each 
observation thus matches a firm’s cumulative abnormal return on the event window to the win 
or loss status of the candidate who shares education background with a director of the firm. 
This regression equation provides an estimate of the stock-market value of a new 
connection to a politician in Congress. In this context, the treatment is one that suddenly puts a 
firm’s connected politician into Congress, as opposed to leaving him where he is. As shown in 
Lee and Lemieux (2010), the Regression Discontinuity Design in close elections produces a 
consistent, unconfounded estimate of the effect of the treatment. This estimate is in fact as good 
as a randomized experiment around the vote share threshold of 50%, and can account for all 
confounding factors prior to the event, be they observable or unobservable. Therefore, instead 
of running regressions trying to control for all relevant covariates, we can focus our empirical 
work on a single regression, while varying the subsample used in the regression. 
In the terminology coined by Lee and Lemieux (2010), we estimate the Weighted 
Average Treatment Effect (WATE), where the weight of each observation is the probability that 
                                                 
3 We did not construct links between people previously working in the same firm, as only a few in our 
sample of politicians have previously worked in a publicly listed firm. 
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a politician experiences a very close election. While some politicians are less likely to have that 
experience than others, the inclusion of highly visible politicians such as John Ashcroft or Walter 
Mondale in our sample implies that our estimate can cover a very large share of the population 
of politicians and is therefore generalizable, unlike previous interpretations of RDD which are 
considered only applicable to the threshold value. Taken together, our estimate well-identifies a 
treatment effect that can shed light on social connections between Congressmen and corporate 
directors. 
The RDD estimates a treatment effect of negative 2.65% during the event window from 
one day before to five days after the election. The effect is robust through many specifications, 
parametric and nonparametric, with different measures of outcomes, under different definitions 
of the social network (former classmates or alumni), and across many subsamples. This result 
means that having a connected politician in Congress significantly decreases the firm’s value by 
2.65% on average. 
To interpret the results, our hypothesis is as follows. The connected politician is already 
providing benefits to the firm at state level, where he may have more time and focus for business 
deals, and faces less institutional and public checks and balances. As a result, when he moves to 
federal office, the firm is expected to get less benefit. We empirically test and confirm three 
implied predictions: (i) the value loss effect should be stronger for politicians coming from state, 
rather than from federal, politics; (ii) the effect is stronger for states with lower institutional 
quality; and (iii) firm activities should decrease in elected politicians’ states. Our result is thus 
interpreted as evidence of a higher value of connections for politicians at the state level than for 
politicians at the federal level. 
Our paper makes two main contributions to the literature on political connections. The 
first contribution is the solution to the identification problem. The most successful approach in 
the existing literature is perhaps the study of political events that happen arguably independently 
of political connections. Knight (2007), Goldman et al. (2008, 2009), and  Mattozzi (2008) 
exploit close elections in presidential races in the U.S.; Roberts (1990), Jayachandran (2006) and 
Fisman et al. (2006) use news and events related to prominent American politicians; while 
Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), 
Ferguson and Voth (2008), and Imai and Shelton (2010) treat politically important events in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Nazi Germany, and Taiwan. This strategy avoids the direct 
reverse causation channel, but, as discussed by Snowberg et al. (2008), many caveats persist, 
notably the unobserved prior probability of each event. The use of prediction markets as a 
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helpful fix is unfortunately only limited to important events such as American presidential 
elections, and thus restrict the scope and undermine the generalizability of such analysis. 
Other articles using non-political firm-related events such as appointments of directors 
(Faccio 2006, Goldman et al. 2009), bailouts (Faccio et al. 2006), IPOs (Fan et al. 2007, Francis 
et al. 2009) are subject to the endogeneity concern that these events are partly triggered by 
certain unobservable characteristics of the firms. Many other important papers such as Khwaja 
and Mian (2005), Dinç (2005), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), Bertrand et al. (2008), 
Claessens et al. (2008), Li et al. (2008), and Boubakri et al. (2009) rely on fixed effects and/or 
difference-in-difference strategies and are thus prone to biases induced by time-varying 
characteristics of firms or politicians/political parties. 
While all of those papers have carried out extensive robustness checks to verify the 
causality channel, few treat the endogeneity of connections. Even in the best event-study setups 
with perfect measures of prior probabilities of events, it is hard to rule out the possibility of 
unobserved firm characteristics affecting both a firm’s outcome and political connections. For 
instance, a defense technology firm can recruit a former secretary of defense because of his 
expertise in defense technologies, and will likely benefit from the political success of his pro-war 
former party fellow members, without this effect deriving from a “political connection,” as 
previously defined. 
Our framework deals adequately with both the endogeneity of the connected politician 
and the selection bias in networks due to homophily, providing a powerful internal validity of the 
empirical results. Moreover, the estimated effect is a WATE across the sample of all politicians 
susceptible to experiencing a close election, and across sampled firms, which are comparable to 
Compustat’s universe. The discovered results are therefore also externally valid. That is, it is 
possible to generalize the conclusions to the population of all firms and politicians. 
The second important contribution is our finding of a negative estimated value of 
connection to politicians holding office. While this result appears at first glance counterintuitive, 
it does not contradict the existing literature on the positive value of political connections (e.g., 
Fisman, 2001, Faccio, 2006, Goldman et al. 2008). We argue that this finding is consistent with  
the incidence of the firm’s lost benefits when the connected politician moves away from state 
politics. This result is consistent with Fisman et al. (2006), who find that, on average, firms do 
not enjoy financial benefits from their connections to Vice President Dick Cheney while he is in 
office. The originality of our result points to the remarkable difference in the institutional 
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environments between the federal and state levels in the U.S., implying very different values of 
political connections. 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology. Section 
3 provides data description. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 discusses and 
explains the findings, and section 6 concludes. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1.    CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE IDENTIFICATION 
Evidence of the impact of a political connection on firm value is subject to two types of 
endogeneity biases. The first bias comes from the endogeneity of the “political” part in “political 
connection.” The estimated effect could reflect (i) a reverse causation channel when a well-
performing firm may be able to help its connected politicians win elections, or (ii) an omitted 
variable bias when connected firms and politicians are affected by the same unobservable factor, 
such as a shift in public opinion. The second bias comes from the endogenous determination of 
the “connection,” usually termed as the problem of homophily when individuals are connected 
because of similarity. 
The endogeneity bias is best eliminated with a randomization of the assignment of a 
politician to office: if the politician is chosen randomly, there is no concern of either the reverse 
causation of firm value changes or the influence of some omitted variables. In practice, it is hard 
to find a randomized experiment on political connection. 
David Lee’s (2008) pioneering work on Regression Discontinuity Designs points out 
that, under the key assumption that candidates are unable to precisely manipulate the result of 
the election, the event of winning close to the vote threshold of 50% is randomized between the 
top two runners as though in a randomized experiment. Intuitively, as candidates only have 
imprecise control over the assignment of win or loss, everyone has approximately the same 
probability of getting a vote share of just above or just below 50% – similar to a coin flip. In 
other words, conditional on the election being close, the incidence of winning or losing is 
independent of all observable and unobservable characteristics of the politician before the 
election. The RDD thus allows an estimation of the average treatment effect of connections to 
elected politicians versus defeated politicians without any reverse causation or omitted variable 
bias, ensuring the internal validity of the results. 
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On their external validity, the results from the RDD are generalizable. Lee and Lemieux 
(2010) point out that the RDD estimate is not only informative for close elections but also for 
others. The estimate can be interpreted as a Weighted Average Treatment Effect (WATE) of 
being politically connected, where each politician’s weight is her ex ante likelihood to be in a 
close election. This likelihood is nontrivial for most American politicians. Even very powerful 
politicians are not immune to close elections, as the Senate majority leader Harry Reid 
experienced in 2010. On the other hand, there is no particularity in firms included in our sample, 
as we will show in Section 3 that our sample of firms is very similar to the Compustat universe. 
2.2.     EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
We follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) in designing two main econometric specifications to 
estimate the effect of political connection. In our context, each observation represents a 
connection between a close-election top-two candidate and a connected firm’s director through a 
specific university program for a given election year. The dependent variable is the 
corresponding firm’s stock price cumulated abnormal return in a window around the election 
day that year. The treatment variable is the indicator whether the connected politician wins or 
loses that race. 
The first specification consists of an OLS regression of the outcome variable on the 
treatment variable, controlling for the vote shares of elected politicians and defeated politicians, 
where the sample is limited to all races with less than 5% vote margin. That is, we obtain the 
OLS estimate ߚመ  in the following equation, where ܸ ௜ܵ stands for vote share: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߚܹ݅݊ܮ݋ݏ݁௜ ൅ ߜௐܸ ௜ܵ૚ሼ௏ௌ೔ஹହ଴%ሽ ൅ ߜ௅ܸ ௜ܵ૚ሼ௏ௌ೔ழହ଴%ሽ ൅ ߝ௜. 
Standard errors are calculated from the OLS regression, and are clustered at the politician 
level for each election. In our robustness checks, we also include a cubic polynomial of the vote 
shares, as well as other levels of clustering. 
The second specification uses nonparametric regressions of the outcome variable on the 
treatment variable on two separate subsamples, of elected politicians and of runners-up. 
Predictions of the outcome variable are calculated at the threshold of 50% for each sample, and 
their difference is reported. Technically, we use the nonparametric local cubic polynomial 
regression of the equation: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ܨሺܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ 
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on the subsample where ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൏ 50% to estimate the function ܨ෠ି ሺ. ሻ and on the 
subsample where ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁௜ ൐ 50% to obtain ܨ෠ାሺ. ሻ . The estimated effect is calculated as 
ܨ෠ାሺ50%ሻ െ ܨ෠ି ሺ50%ሻ.
4 
2.3. OTHER ISSUES 
By defining connections by all pairs of classmates, we may raise doubts about the realistic 
nature of those connections, as most people have only a small number of friends even among 
classmates (see, for instance, Leider et al. 2009). Yet this should not be a concern to the 
significance of our results. The measurement errors in this case imply that the effect of real 
friendships is nuanced by many non-friends classmate connections, thus produce an attenuation 
bias that reduces the absolute size of the estimate and its statistical significance. The effect of real 
friendships can then be even larger than those found in this paper. On the other hand, classmate 
connections can be primordial in the development of relationships after college or graduate 
school by providing common ground in communication and mutual trust as well as common 
access to the same social network. In that sense, former classmates are much more likely to later 
develop a strong connection, even if they not close friends while in college or graduate school. In 
fact, several recent papers have shown the strength of this measurement of connections in many 
contexts (Cohen et al. 2008, Nguyen 2011, Fracassi 2009). 
While the links between firms and elected congressmen are identified as an almost-
random treatment in our context, the full social networks of classmates and alumni, including 
links to both elected and defeated congressmen, are taken as exogenously given. This definition 
of social network, while ruling out direct reverse causality (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008), still tolerates 
the problem of homophily (McPherson et al. 2001). Accordingly, future politicians and directors 
sharing similar characteristics and preferences may have been drawn together at the same 
university; decades later the elected politician may enact policies in favor of these same 
characteristics, on which the director’s firm can profit, without passing through the social 
network channel. In essence, unobservable factors could determine both these connections, 
politician’s preferences, firm’s activities, and market reaction to elections (i.e., value is only 
                                                 
4 The standard error is calculated as a standard error of the difference of two independent variables, as the 
two subsamples are completely separate from one another. Cluster-adjusted standard errors are not shown. In each 
local polynomial regression, the clusters near the threshold are very similar to single observations, therefore cluster-
adjusted standard errors will not differ much from unclustered ones. 
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affected when the similar politician is elected). For example, if a politician and a director went to 
a university that specializes in military studies, then the election of the former has the potential to 
affect the latter’s firm value through new defense policies, rather than through the social 
network. In sum, identification problems of the effect in question emerge when certain 
unobservables influence both the outcomes at the firm level and the explanatory variable of 
political connection. While the RDD does identify the effect of “political connection” as we 
define it, this effect may not be the fruit of social network mechanisms but may instead result 
from common characteristics. 
Our setup allows for a simple solution: the common, time-invariant characteristics of 
school cohorts can be captured by school fixed effects. The estimated effect is then identified 
across years and by individuals who went to more than one school. As it turns out, the results are 
not much affected by the inclusion of school fixed effects, hence homophily is not a prevalent 
problem for our estimation. 
In summary, our research design correctly identifies and consistently estimates the 
WATE of being connected to a politician in Congress, where the effect is averaged with weights 
over the sample of all politicians who stand a chance of experiencing a close election, and all 
firms in Compustat. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We assemble our sample using data from a few sources. First, we collect the federal 
election results from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website. Every two years, FEC 
publishes certified federal election results compiled from each state’s election office and other 
official sources. The published data contains information on primary, runoff, and general 
election results for the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and, when applicable, the 
U.S. President. For each election, we identify the candidate finishing first and second and 
calculate the margin of votes between the top two candidates. A close election is specified by a 
margin of votes of less than 5%. 
As reported in Panel A of Table D1, we identify 128 close elections for U.S. Senate (23 
elections) and Congress (105 elections) between 2000 and 2008 in our sample. The average 
Win/Loss margin across all election is 2.54% (2.42% with Senate elections and 2.57% with 
House of Representatives elections). Panel B shows summary statistics of elections and 
politicians per year. The average annual number of elections is 26 (with a maximum of 36, and 
11 
 
minimum of 15). Our sample elections involve on average 89 politicians per year, with a 
maximum of 112 and minimum of 61. The average number of connected firms per year is 362. 
 
[Insert Table D1 Here] 
 
We hand-collect the biographical record of these elections using Marquis Who’s Who 
biographies, which contain active and inactive biographies from the Who’s Who publications. Our 
scope of search includes biographies in (i) Who’s Who in American Politics, (ii) Member Biographical 
Profiles – Current Congress, (iii) World Almanac of U.S. Politics, and (iv) The Almanac of American 
Politics. For each candidate, Who’s Who biographies provide a brief vita, including the candidate’s 
employment history, all undergraduate and graduate degrees attained, the year in which those 
degrees were awarded, and the awarding institution. Most of the biographies for our sample are 
available in Who’s Who. To complete our biographies, we use Library of Congress Web Archives, 
Internet Archives, politicians’ archived websites, and other sources on the World Wide Web. We 
retain entries for which we can positively identify the politician.  
Next, we obtain biographical information and past education history for directors and 
senior company officers from BoardEx of Management Diagnostics Limited. The data details 
the relational links among board directors and senior company officers for both active and 
inactive firms by cross-referencing these directors’ and officers’ employment history, educational 
background, and professional qualifications. In particular, the data contains current and past 
roles of each official in a company with start and end date (year), all undergraduate and graduate 
degrees attained, the year in which those degrees were awarded, and the awarding institution. We 
restrict our sample to board directors in U.S. publicly listed firms. 
We construct our social network measure through educational institutions. We define a 
political connection as a link between a firm’s director and an election candidate who graduate 
from the same university program within a year. We thereby match institutions and degrees on 
Who’s Who biographies and BoardEx. Following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), we group 
the degrees into six categories: (i) business school (Master of Business Administration), (ii) 
medical school, (iii) general graduate (Master of Arts or Master of Science), (iv) Doctor of 
Philosophy, (v) law school, and (vi) general undergraduate. To identify a politician’s alumni 
network, we relax the restriction on year of graduation. Finally, we match our data to stock 
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
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Panel C reports the distribution of common educational backgrounds of directors and 
politicians in our sample. Degrees for undergraduate studies seem to be the most important to 
the connection of directors and politicians: 74.8% of politicians and 86.8% of directors are 
connected through their undergraduate studies, having graduated from the same 
school/university within one year. The figures are 9.6% and 3.6% for law school; 7.6% and 4.6% 
for business school; 6.8% and 4.2% for other graduate degrees. Medical school and doctoral 
degrees appear to be insignificant in connecting politicians to directors. Only 0.4% of politicians 
and 0.1% of directors are connected through medical school, while 0.8% of politicians and 0.7% 
of directors are connected through Ph.D. programs. 
Panel D reports characteristic of firms in our sample and compares them to firms in the 
Compustat universe. The sample’s firm average market capitalization is $2.05 billion, with a 
maximum of $58.64 billion and a median of $0.38 billion, which are fairly comparable to 
Compustat average firms ($2.35 billion, $467.09 billion, and $0.24 billion, respectively). Our 
average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 4.61 and age of 8.62 years, as compared to a market-
to-book ratio of 4.28 and age of 8.08 years for an average Compustat firm. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we report main empirical results of our regression discontinuity design, 
with additional results on alternative outcome variables and alternative windows. We also present 
results from alternative, non-parametric estimations, as well as the results on the impact of 
political connections across many sub-samples. 
4.1. ESTIMATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS USING A REGRESSION 
DISCONTINUITY DESIGN 
Table 1 presents our estimation of the impact of political connection on firm value by 
relating stock price Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CAR) of connected firms around the election 
day to the win/lose status of the connected politician. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to 
a candidate finishing first or second in a close election, both of whom graduate from the same 
university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). For every connected firm, we obtain daily 
stock returns for the 6-day event period (from day -1 to day 5), as well for a 255-day pre-event 
period (from day -315 to day -61). The event day (day 0) is the election day reported by the 
Federal Election Commission, which is always a trading day. We follow a conventional event 
study method to calculate the abnormal returns resulting from close elections by assuming a 
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single-factor model with the beta estimated from the pre-event window (the results are not 
sensitive to the method of estimation of the abnormal returns). We exploit the RDD of close 
elections by limiting the sample to elections in which the vote share between the top two 
candidates is between 48.5% and 52.5% (i.e., within a 5% vote share margin), and by controlling 
for the vote shares separately for winners and losers, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), to 
obtain the effect at the exact threshold of 50%. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
We find a strongly negative and statistically significant effect of connection to a close 
election winner on CARs. Column (2) shows the benchmark specification (vote share margin of 
5% or less, controlling separately for winners’ and losers’ vote shares) with 1,819 observations 
across 1,268 firms and 170 politicians, producing an estimate of -2.65%, significant at 1%. 
Column (3) controls additionally for quartic polynomials of winners’ and of losers’ vote shares, 
so as to single out the effect exactly at the threshold of 50% vote share (as suggested as a 
robustness check by Lee and Lemieux 2010), and reports an even larger effect of -4.07%, 
significant at 1%. Alternatively, we limit the sample to vote margins of 1% or less in column (1), 
and again find a strong, 5%-significant effect of -3.12%. These specifications indicate that being 
connected to a congressman in office decreases a firm’s value by around 3% on average. 
Columns (4) to (8) further show that the results are unaffected by “irrelevant covariates.” 
Indeed, when the treatment is comparable to a randomized experiment, any additional control 
variable must be independent of the treatment, thus its inclusion should not significantly alter the 
estimate of the treatment effect. Column (4) controls for characteristics of the politician (dummy 
variables for the party, gender, incumbency, Senate/House race), and column (5) for market 
capitalization (a proxy for firm size), producing estimates very close to the benchmark in column 
(2) and all significant at 1%. In a similar vein, unobservable characteristics of the election year or 
the industry are also irrelevant covariates and thus do not alter much the main estimate, as 
shown in columns (6) and (7). As expected, the main results are not driven by any year-specific 
or industry-specific unobservables. 
Including fixed effects for educational institutions, however, may substantially affect the 
main estimate, if a strong homophily factor pertains in the formation of the school networks that 
we consider, as discussed in the previous section. Controlling for school fixed effects, column (8) 
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still produces a similar, slightly larger estimate of -2.91%, significant at 1%. It implies that 
network homophily is relatively irrelevant to our treatment, and shared school characteristics are 
not the factor behind the negative estimate of the value of connection reported in Table 1.5 
While the cross-sectional distribution of CARs includes some very large observations, 
column (9) shows that even after taking out all CARs exceeding 50% in absolute value, the result 
still remains strong at -2.18%. 
The absolute size of the effect, namely 2.65% after 7 days, is 24% of the standard 
deviation of CARs in our sample. In comparison to other event studies, Faccio (2006) reports an 
average effect of 1.43% on CARs for worldwide firms experiencing an event of new political 
connection, while Goldman et al. (2009) show an effect on CARs of 8.97% in difference 
between Republican-connected and Democrat-connected firms in the event of the 2000 
presidential election. No existing results find a negative estimate of having an additional political 
connection. 
In summary, Table 1 provides evidence that firms connected to the winner in a close 
election to the U.S. Congress between 2000 and 2008 experience significant loss in firm value, as 
compared to firms connected to the runner-up. The results are robust and consistent when we 
control for politicians’ characteristics, firm size, election year-, industry- and school-fixed effects. 
Our results imply that political connections affect firm value, and there is a significant variation 
in the value of political connections. In the following sections, we further investigate the sources 
of variation and interpret our results. 
4.2.    ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we explore alternative specifications with different event windows and 
calculations of the CARs. Table 2 summarizes this exercise. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
In Panel A, we vary the event window of (-1,5) used in Table 1. If the election results are 
priced in stock values immediately, the effect reported in the previous section should be 
                                                 
5 We do not include company fixed effects, as there is very little variation within companies across years, 
with many companies appearing only once, thus omitted from such a fixed-effect regression. 
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detectable only in a small window over the event day, and not before the event. On the other 
hand, the presence of the effect days after the event implies that the market takes time to fully 
react to this form of information. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A report the results of regressions using CARs from 
different pre-event windows, from day -7 to day -1 and from day -1 to day 0. The coefficient of 
interest is not statistically significant and always very small in size. This verifies that the treatment 
has not been predicted by the market prior to the event, as expected from the close elections 
design. 
While column (3) reports the benchmark result for the window from day -1 to day 5, as 
in column (2) of Table 1, columns (4) and (5) use different starting days for the event window, 
namely beginning on the event day (day 0) and day 1, and ending on day 5. Interestingly, we find 
negative and significant coefficients on the Win/Lose dummy, of about 70% the size of the 
benchmark estimate in column (3). This result implies that market reaction after one day 
accounts to only about 30% of the full effect, and substantial further reaction occurs even after 
day 1 up to day 5. We can consequently create a portfolio on day 1 after the event, knowing all 
the results of elections, shorting on firms connected to closely elected politicians and longing on 
those connected to closely defeated ones, with equal weights on firm connections (i.e., a firm’s 
stock is counted twice if it is connected to two different politicians). From day 1 to day 5, this 
portfolio yields a risk-free return of 1.85%. 
Beyond our benchmark window, such as from day 6 to day 20 after the election day, as 
reported in column (6), we find an insignificant estimate of the value of connection. While this 
finding is consistent with the market having fully priced in the news after day 5, it could also be 
due to the presence of much additional noise, which hinders statistical significance. 
In all regressions throughout the paper, we calculate the heteroskedasticity-corrected 
standard errors clustered at the level of politician-election year level to avoid the potential 
downward bias of standard error estimates when the error terms can be autocorrelated among 
observations sharing the same politician and election year (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
2004). The qualitative results are strongly robust to other levels of clustering, including by 
director, firm, year, and politician’s state, and are available upon request. 
Given the high cross-sectional variance of CARs, one may worry that our results are 
affected by stocks with aberrantly high volatility. Simply censoring aberrant values, as shown in 
column (9) of Table 1, does not solve the issue, because of a potential censoring bias. A different 
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approach consists of normalizing each stock’s CAR by its standard error derived from the 
market model within the event window. Panel B of Table 2 presents Table 1’s regressions with 
this new outcome variable, with the same qualitative results as in Panel A. Being connected to an 
elected politician has a statistically significant impact of about negative 32.2% on a firm’s 
standardized CAR, or about one third of a standard deviation of the firm’s CARs during the 
event window.6 
In other tests of robustness reported in Appendix Table A1, we calculate the CARs using 
different methods, including Fama-French’s three-factor model and the three-factor model with 
momentum (Fama and French 1993, and Carhart 1997). We also use the cumulative daily stock 
(raw) returns without a market model as the outcome variable. We find estimates mostly similar 
to those reported in Table 1, either including or excluding school fixed effects. In Appendix 
Table A1, we also report results for alternative specifications of a unit of observation. In the 
benchmark model, we choose an observation as a classmate connection between a politician and 
a director for a given election year, where the treatment variable is binary. That empirical design 
implies the interpretation of the estimate as the WATE of an additional connection to a 
politician in office. In alternative specifications, we can choose a unit of observation as a director 
or a firm (each for a given election day), where the treatment variable is the count of connections 
to elected politicians. The difference is in the weights: while each connection has the same 
weight in the benchmark setup, in alternative specifications, the same-weight unit could be 
director, or firm, or politician. Table A1 shows very similar results. 
In further robustness checks, Table 3 reports the result of the nonparametric 
specification as detailed in Section 2. Column (1) shows a 1%-statistically significant estimated 
effect of negative 3.40%, which is even stronger than in Table 1. Columns (2) to (5) indicate that 
the effect is robust in size and statistically significant across a wide range of bandwidths. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Our RDD has so far exclusively focused on the vote share threshold of 50%. In columns 
(6) to (9), we further test the robustness of our result by applying the same method to “placebo” 
                                                 
6 Other robustness checks include the verification of the near-randomness of winning or losing a close 
election (as previously verified by Lee 2008). They are available upon request. 
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thresholds of vote share, instead of the actual cut-off at 50%. For example, in the sample used 
for column (6), a politician is marked as elected if his vote share is 48% or above, and marked as 
defeated otherwise. We then apply the nonparametric regression around the placebo cutoff of 
48% and report the corresponding estimate. Because such a placebo threshold does not separate 
winners from losers in reality, we do not expect to find results similar to column (1). Columns 
(6) to (9) confirm our prediction: for the placebo thresholds of 48%, 49%, 51% and 52%, the 
estimate is always positive and not statistically significant at 10%. 
Figure 1 visualizes the numerical results presented in Table 3, where each half of the 
graph represents the fitted local polynomial of degree 3 for vote shares greater or less than 50% 
(for elected or defeated politicians, respectively). We see a large gap at exactly 50% of vote share, 
whereas the gradient of the graph is relatively small elsewhere, as already tested with placebo 
thresholds in Table 3. Furthermore, there is (visual) evidence of a “Z” shape of CAR with 
respect to vote share: as vote share increases around 50%, CAR first increases, then drops 
sharply at the threshold of 50%, and then increases again. As explained by Cuñat et al. (2009), 
this Z shape is predictable in a model where the market internalizes available information before 
election and anticipates the gap at 50% if the prior probabilities of winning or losing are 
markedly different from 50%. For instance, for an election resulting in vote shares of 52%-48%, 
it is likely that the market’s prior probability of the first candidate’s winning is notably larger than 
50%, hence part of the gap at 50% has already been incorporated in market prices even before 
the election. Therefore, we do not see a large difference between the CARs at 48% and at 52% 
on the graph in Figure 1. 
However, the robustness of the Z shape depends on the relatively strong hypothesis that 
no confounding factors can possibly bias the non-parametric estimation in the whole range of 
vote shares between 48.5% and 52.5%. This hypothesis is not necessary for the consistency of 
RDD, which depends only on the lack of full manipulation at exactly the threshold of 50%. That 
is, if one thinks that elections of 4-5% margin cannot be considered close and may present 
endogeneity problems with respect to the identity of the winner or loser, then such endogeneity 
can significantly affect the Z-shape, but it cannot invalidate the RDD result obtained from the 
50% threshold. 
In summary, Tables 2 and 3 (and A1) show that our results are very robust to different 
methodological specifications. Furthermore, they are found only in specifications where the 
treatment matters, and not in tests with irrelevant event windows or irrelevant vote share 
thresholds. Consequently, political connection must be the causal factor behind these results. 
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4.3. EFFECTS BY GROUPS 
The previous sub-section shows the robust, consistent, and strong impact of firms’ 
political connections on firm value. We now explore whether that impact is present in different 
sub-groups of companies. Table 4 summarizes our results. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
Our identification strategy is based on close Senate and House elections from 2000 to 
2008. As the Senate and the House serve different missions, we might expect that the value of a 
firm’s connection to a member of the House or to a member of the Senate might be different. 
We thus divide our samples into two subsamples of firms depending on whether the close 
election is for the Senate or the House, rerun the benchmark regression in column (2) of Table 1, 
and report the respective results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. For both subsamples, the 
results are consistent with our pooled regression results from Table 1, and significant at 1% and 
10% respectively: in both the Senate and the House, firms connected to the winner experience 
significant loss in firm value. In addition, firms connected to the winner in a close Senate 
election appear to experience a greater loss of firm value than do firms connected to the winner 
in a close House election (-4.24% against -2.14%). 
We also explore whether a candidate’s position as incumbent or challenger in a close 
election and her prior political experience affect our results, by partitioning the sample 
accordingly. Regression results from columns (3) and (4) show that firms connected to the 
winner who is a challenger experience a significant loss of value, while the effect is not significant 
among incumbents. In columns (5) and (6), we further explore the sample of Democrats and of 
Republicans. In both cases, the effect is statistically significant at 5%, with a slightly larger size 
for Republicans than for Democrats (-2.86% versus -2.43%). 
Our measure of social networks is based on the network between directors and 
politicians. As independent directors and executive directors are supposed to assume different 
tasks, we repeat our tests in subsamples of connections through independent directors and 
executive directors. We find, as reported in columns (7) and (8), that firms connected to a 
politician through one of its independent directors experience a significant loss of value (-
2.76%), while the impact is not significant in firms connected to a politician through an inside 
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(executive) director. In the latter sample, the estimate at -1.84% is still negative and sizeable, and 
the lack of significance could be attributed to the small sample size. 
The impact of political connection on firm value may also depend on the nature of the 
connection. We investigate this direction by checking the estimates across different school 
networks. We sort the educational institutions by the number of observations in the sample, as it 
is important to look at the number of prominent graduates that rise to the top in business and 
politics, and not just at any graduate from the same year. Intuitively, when a network is better 
represented in the sample, its links are arguably stronger in Granovetter’s (1974) sense, in that 
each pair share more common connections. Such a network has a higher measure of network 
closure, according to Karlan et al. (2009), and is more conducive to agreements that require 
commitments between pairs in the network. In contrast, Karlan et al. (2009) show that a low 
closure network is provides better incentives for information sharing. 
Through this exercise, Harvard and Yale come out as the two most represented 
universities (if we had looked at the number of graduates each year, large state universities would 
have dominated). Column (9) reports the estimate of -3.92% for the subsample of connections 
based on those two networks, while columns (10) and (11) show the results for the subsamples 
of universities that are below and above the median number of observations, respectively at -
2.45% and -2.55%. The effect is markedly stronger for Harvard and Yale as compared with the 
average, yet little difference between the subsamples above and below median. This result is 
consistent with an explanation that network strength and network closure matter only at the very 
top schools, and that political connections matter mostly as commitment devices for deals, rather 
than for information sharing purposes. However, we cannot rule out some alternative 
explanations, such as that the media pay more attention to the educational background of 
graduates from Harvard and Yale, or that there are other unobserved elements very specific to 
these universities that help strengthen this effect. 
In summary, Table 4 shows that our finding—that connections to a politician in a close 
election incur a significant loss in firm value—is consistent and robust to the type of election 
(Senate vs. House), as well as across several subsamples and subgroups. 
4.4. ALUMNI NETWORK 
We have so far identified the social connections between a board director of a firm and a 
politician by the criterion that the politician and the director graduate within one year from the 
same university, campus, college, or professional school. In this subsection, we study the impact 
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of a politician’s alumni network by relaxing the restriction on year of graduation. Columns (1) to 
(9) in Table 5 replicate the same tests from Table 1 and report the results. Column (10) reruns 
the benchmark non-parametric test in column (1) of Table 3. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
The benchmark regression in column (2) shows that an additional connection to an 
elected politician in alumni networks reduces a firm’s CARs by 0.58%. This estimate is 
statistically significant at 5% but much smaller than the corresponding estimate of -2.65% for 
classmate networks, as reported in column (2), Table 1. The non-parametric test reported in 
column (10) produces a larger coefficient of -1.38%, statistically significant at 1%. Across the 
columns of Table 5, the negative and significant estimates of the value of alumni-network 
political connection on the CARs remain consistent, with coefficient sizes much smaller than in 
Table 1. (In columns (1) and (6), the results are no longer significant at 10%, though they are   
negative.) 
The smaller estimates in Table 5, as compared with Table 1, can be explained in two 
different ways. First, one should expect the links between alumni who are not classmates to be 
less important than the links between classmates. Because our result is an average effect over all 
pairs of connected individuals, the estimate should be smaller in size in alumni networks than in 
classmate networks. Second, as our connection variable is only a proxy for friendships or 
acquaintances in reality, the presence of measurement errors will likely imply an attenuation bias 
on our estimates. As more measurement error is probable in the alumni networks than in 
classmate networks, the attenuation bias will be more important for the alumni networks, leading 
to smaller estimates, as found in Table 5. 
Overall, results from Table 5 show that our main results remain consistent when we relax 
our measure of social networks to alumni networks. In our context, we still find a social network 
effect even in a sample constructed with a less stringent definition of social network. 
5. EXPLANATION OF THE RESULTS 
The robust finding that connections to politicians in Congress reduce firm value appears 
in contrast to the existing literature on political connections. In this section, we propose and 
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verify an explanation for this apparently counter-intuitive phenomenon: politicians in fact bring 
more value to connected firms before, rather than after, being elected to the federal level. Before 
their elections to the Capitol, most politicians have had political experience at the state level, 
which has probably already resulted in benefits for connected firms. If the politicians win their 
congressional elections and move to federal politics, those firms’ benefits of connections can be 
much harder to maintain. On the one hand, an elected politician will probably have much less 
time and focus for specific state matters that relate to their connected firms. On the other hand, 
the strong checks and balances in federal politics in the United States may already block all 
channels by which firms connected with politicians through social networks could obtain 
significant financial benefits, as shown by Fisman et al. (2006) in the example of firms connected 
to former Vice President Dick Cheney. Consequently, from a firm’s perspective, it may be 
preferable that its socially connected politician remain at the state level, rather than get elected to 
federal office. 
This line of argument offers several further testable predictions based on the 
characteristics of the state from which the politician comes, as well as those of the politician and 
those of the firm, as stated below: 
Prediction 1: The loss of value is only present for politicians coming from high-level 
state politics, not from politicians previously holding federal offices, including incumbents.  
Prediction 2: In states with stronger institutional checks and balances, firms receive 
fewer benefits from their state-level political connections through social networks. 
Prediction 3: Firm activities in the connected politician’s state should decline following 
the politician’s successful election, as compared with an unsuccessful one. Other firm 
characteristics may also determine the value of political connections. 
We will test those predictions by dividing the sample according to the determinants of 
benefits from political connections from those predictions, along the line of institution quality 
measures, of politician’s career background, and of firm’s size and activities, then run the 
benchmark regression in each subsample and compare the estimates. The following subsections 
will detail the corresponding results. 
5.1. TESTS BASED ON POLITICIAN’S BACKGROUND 
Prediction 1 provides the most direct test of our explanation that is based on the 
background of candidates for Congress. We collect information on the positions these 
candidates have held up to election and classify four categories of politicians whose main 
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occupation in the election year was (1) in a public office at federal level; (2) in a public office at 
state level, or below; (3) in a corporate environment; or (4) in other environments, including 
NGOs, labor unions, and independent professions, such as doctors and professors. Table 6 
reports the benchmark estimates by the corresponding subsamples. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
Columns (1) and (2) respectively show the estimate for the subsample of incumbent 
congressmen and challengers. The challengers also include candidates in a race for an open seat 
from which the incumbent had retired. Consequently there are significantly more challengers 
than incumbents (if all races comprise an incumbent and a challenger, by the logic of close-
election near-randomization, incumbents should roughly number the same as challengers). 
Among challengers, the estimate of -3.24% is statistically significant at 1% and stronger than the 
average effect found in Table 1, while the estimate is not significant among incumbents. This 
result suggests that removing an incumbent from office does not significantly affect a connected 
firm’s value, while having a connected politician elected to Congress significantly reduces it. 
Columns (3) to (8) consider smaller subsamples among challengers. Columns (3) and (4) 
distinguish between challengers coming from various positions at the federal level (for instance, 
in a senator’s office) and others. As our explanation would predict, the effect is insignificant and 
close to zero for the former, while significantly negative for the latter. We further decompose the 
subsample in column (4) into politicians coming from public offices, from the business world 
and others, with results shown respectively in columns (5), (7), and (8). The estimate in column 
(5) is negative, while not statistically significant at 10%. A deeper investigation in this subsample 
shows that the type of positions held by those challengers varies widely, from mayors and district 
court clerks to state legislators and governors, and this diversity potentially adds much noise to 
the subsample in column (5). Indeed, when we refine this subsample to only those who had 
previously held top-level positions as governors or state legislators, the estimate comes out 
statistically significant at -3.28%, as shown in column (6), even for a much smaller sample size. 
The estimate for candidates coming from the corporate world shown in column (7) is 
also strongly negative and significant, suggesting that firms connected to the candidate suffer a 
loss in value due to the candidate’s exit from the business world. Put another way, a candidate 
brings more value to a connected firm as long as he or she remains in the business world. On the 
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other hand, for the group of candidates from non-political, non-business occupations, the 
estimated effect is close to zero, as reported in column (8). 
Taken together, Table 6 shows that a candidate’s election to Congress clearly destroys 
value of connected firms if the elected congressman has been sufficiently entrenched in his home 
state. In contrast, the value of incumbent congressmen or of congressmen coming from 
positions in federal office is not significantly different from zero. While this test is still subject to 
the problem of selection into occupations and offices prior to elections, it strongly supports our 
explanation that politicians bring value to firms only at state level. 
Related to incumbent’s background, we push prediction 1 further for incumbent 
candidates, using their membership in congressional committees. The results are reported in 
Table 7 below. 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
While the average value of connection to an incumbent congressman is estimated to be 
insignificantly different from zero, as shown in column (1), certain congressmen may be 
particularly powerful, and garner above-average benefits for their connected firms. We explore 
this possibility by considering subsamples of members of important committees. Column (2) 
shows a particularly strong positive effect of 7.74% (statistically significant at 5%) on firm value 
when a congressman in the committees on appropriations in either house is defeated in a close 
election. The appropriations committees of both houses control the allocation of federal funds 
to specific projects and are often regarded as the most important committees in Congress (see, 
e.g., Aghion et al., 2009). This finding shows that a politician’s membership in appropriation 
committees is indeed very valuable to connected firms. 
We do not find consistent evidence of the value of connection to members of other 
committees in Congress. Columns (3) to (6) report results for groups of committees in both 
houses, classified by their relations to natural resources, energy, and agriculture in column (3); the 
armed forces, government, and congressional affairs in column (4); education, science, health, 
and labor in column (5); and economic, financial, and budgetary issues in column (6). In 
comparison with column (2), none of those subsamples produce a similar positive effect. 
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On the other hand, the subsample of Senate committees produces a large positive 
estimate of 8.59%, as shown in column (7). This effect is due mostly to senior members of the 
Senate. In fact, if we limit the sample to senators in their 4th year or beyond in committees, as 
reported in column (8), the effect of 10.40% is economically important; whereas in the other half 
of the sample of senators, shown in column (9), the effect becomes negative.7 This finding 
confirms the role of seniority in Congress as previously stressed in political science (e.g., Roberts, 
1990; Kellerman and Shepsle, 2009). 
Results from Tables 6 and 7 indicate that the value of connection to a congressman 
initially drops when the freshly elected congressman moves away from his previous position at 
state level, and is only restored once he becomes senior and powerful in Congress. However, 
given the small number of senators (by election year) in the regressions in Table 7, those results 
related to senators may lack robustness. Conservatively, we are most confident with the first part 
of the storyline, namely the drop in value when the congressman moves from state level to 
federal office. 
5.2. TESTS BASED ON STATE CHARACTERISTICS 
Moving away from politicians’ backgrounds, prediction 2 concerns a different dimension 
of our explanation: under better checks and balances at the state level, the estimated effect of 
connection should be weaker. Table 8 shows various ample support of this prediction.8 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
Columns (1) and (2) distinguish between politicians’ states having more or less than 
median regulations. The index of regulation by state is measured for 1999 in Clemson 
                                                 
7  To be more precise, we measure seniority by averaging over a congressman’s seniority across her 
committees to make the subsamples in columns (8) and (9) exclusive. The choice of 4th year experience is closest to 
the sample median. 
8 Those results are also confirmed by regressions, including an interaction between our main explanatory 
variable, Win/Lose, and a dummy variable distinguishing between good and bad institutions, measured in ways 
similar to those shown in Table 8. Because these regressions implicitly impose the same coefficients for the controls 
of vote share for each subsample, they are less preferred than our reported results, and are only available upon 
request. 
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University’s Report on Economic Freedom, http://freedom.clemson.edu. This report combines 
information on labor and environmental regulations and regulations in specific industries such as 
insurance. As expected, we find a strongly significant effect in states with more regulations, 
where the potential is greater for politicians to grant benefits to connected firms on a 
discretionary basis. 
Instead of regulations, columns (3) to (8) attempt to divide states by actual level of 
corruption. The most commonly used measure of state-level corruption comes from Glaeser and 
Saks (2006), who extract actual conviction data from the Department of Justice’s “Report to 
Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section” to form a measure of 
the ratio of convicted corruption cases by population size, averaged from 1976 to 2002 to 
remove periodical noises. Columns (3) and (4) use that measure to show a more sizable and 
significant effect for more corrupt states. 
Because one may expect that actual conviction cases only amount to a small fraction of 
real corrupt deals, the measure of actual conviction may not truly depict the extent of corruption 
in a state. We overcome this concern by using Saiz and Simonsohn’s (2008) approach of 
“downloading wisdom from online crowds.” More specifically, columns (5) and (6) use a 
measure of search hits on Exalead.com for the term “corruption” near the name of the main city 
in each state, normalized by the number of search hits for the name of that main city, to divide  
the sample of all states into those with higher or lower than median corruption, as reported in 
the news. While Exalead.com conducts web-based searches, columns (7) and (8) use the dataset 
of all newspapers gathered in Newslibrary.com to search for the word “corruption” close to the 
state name, with the number of search hits normalized by the search hits for the state name 
alone. We can thus cover cases of corruption as reported both on the internet and in newspapers. 
Both measures yield satisfying results that support our intuition, as the effect is clearly stronger 
and statistically significant in more corrupt states, while it is indistinguishable from zero in less 
corrupt states. 
As these measures of institutional qualities are calculated before this paper’s period of 
study, we partly avoid the problem of direct reverse causation. However, the use of measures of 
corruption or regulations may expose us to the problem of endogenous selection, where certain 
unobserved characteristics may affect both the selection into good or bad institutional designs, 
and later affect the political connection that we estimate. While we still have clearly identified the 
WATE of political connections, we cannot ascertain that its variation across states truly comes 
from the differences in institutional quality. This endogeneity problem is a perennial problem in 
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all studies of the economics of institutions, where the exogeneity and excludability of 
instrumental variables are keys to the answer. 
In columns (9) and (10) we attempt to check this problem by using GCISC, a measure of 
population concentration around the state capital city.  As developed by Campante and Do 
(2010), this measure is highly predictive of several measures of qualities of political governance 
both across countries and across American states (higher concentration implies better institution 
quality because of the political pressure of the population). This measure is also highly persistent 
over time and is arguably much less directly affected by institution qualities than by historical 
events, such as the somewhat arbitrary choice of state capitals. As expected, our estimated effect 
is strongly significant among states of lower-than-median population concentration, as shown in 
column (9), while in column (10), the effect is practically indistinct from zero. 
In sum, Table 8 provides evidence that the estimated effect of political connection is all 
the more important in states that are more corrupt, have more regulations, and worse institutions, 
entirely in accordance with our explanation of the differential value of political connections 
between state-level politics and federal politics. 
5.3. TESTS BASED ON FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
We now study firm characteristics as potential determinants of the relationship between 
political connections and firm value, and detail the first set of results in Table 9. 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
Columns (1) and (2) report regression results on two subsamples of firms whose market 
capitalization is respectively above or below the median. The difference between those results 
indicates that smaller politically connected firms experience greater loss of value when the 
connected politician wins an election to Congress (loss of 6.56% for smaller firms, significant at 
1%, as compared with no effect among larger firms). Put differently, political connections are 
more important for small firms. Larger firms may be connected to many politicians, and the 
financial benefit of connection to one more politician may only represent a small fraction of the 
firm’s value; hence, for larger firms, we expect a smaller effect. 
One may conjecture that firms benefit from political connections thanks to easier access 
to finance, as shown by Khwaja and Mian (2005). Accordingly, we investigate whether the value 
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of political connection is associated with the firm’s dependence on external finance. We 
construct Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) measure of dependence on external finance by 3-digit SIC 
industries as the industry average of (CapEx – Cashflow from Operations)/CapEx, then divide 
our sample into industries with above and below median scores. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 
report our standard regression results on these two sub-samples. For industries relying more on 
external finance, the coefficient on the Win/Lose dummy is -2.99% and significant at 5%; in 
contrast, for the subsample of industries with less dependence on external financial sources, the 
estimated effect is insignificant at conventional levels. Firms that are financially independent 
seem not to be affected after election results. 
The estimated effect appears to be particularly strong when determinants are interacted. 
Column (5) shows that small firms that rely heavily on external finance incur a very high loss of 
value: the average loss is 5.64% (significant at 1%) in firm value as a result of a connection to a 
politician in federal office. Column (6) considers the subsample of states with higher than 
median corruption, using the Newslibrary.com measure as detailed in the previous subsection, 
for which the distance between the firm’s headquarters and the politician’s state is in the smallest 
quartile (less than 650km). Such distance is used as a proxy for the presence and interests of the 
firm in the politician’s state, as we expect the effect to be stronger for firms that do more 
business in the politician’s state. The estimated effect in column (6) is much stronger than in 
column (7) of Table 8, and much stronger than for the sample with the limitation by distance 
alone.9 In column (7), the sample is limited to states with higher than median corruption, and to 
industries with higher than median reliance on external finance. As expected, the effect is 
strongly significant, and is much larger than both column (3) and column (7) of Table 8. 
The estimation results shown in Table 9 indirectly corroborate the storyline that firms get 
benefit from politicians before their election to federal office. A more direct test of Prediction 3 
can be based on the change in firm activities after the event of the election. Unfortunately, 
systematic data on firm activities by state and year, measured either by sales or investment, are 
unavailable. 
We surmount this difficulty by providing a new measure of firm activities by state and 
year. Again, we follow Saiz and Simonsohn’s (2008) idea of “downloading wisdom” by searching 
each company’s name through local newspapers in the connected politician’s state within each 
                                                 
9 Results on the division relating to the distance between a firm’s headquarters and a politician’s state are 
available upon request. 
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year, using Newslibrary.com; we then normalize the number of search hits by the search hits for 
the neutral keyword “September” across the same set of newspapers. The resulting hit rate is 
used as a proxy of a firm’s activities within a state in a certain year. We further remove any firm-
state fixed effect by looking at only the change in the hit rate after each year, then use this 
measure of changes of firm activities across various windows and subsamples as the dependent 
variable in our benchmark regressions, and report the results in Table 10.10 
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
Columns (1) to (3) focus on the subsample of challengers with top state experience that 
was used in column (6) of Table 6. Column (1), in particular, shows that being connected to an 
elected congressman clearly reduces a firm’s activities in the corresponding state from the 
election year (where elections are held in November) to the following year, with a coefficient of -
1.54 percentage points of hit rates. Column (2) presents a placebo test in the period before the 
event, between election year -1 and the election year. The resulting small estimate—
insignificantly different from zero—indicates that the treated and control samples are very 
similar before the event, thus confirming the RDD. We notice from column (3) that any 
adjustment following the event has been accomplished by 1 year after the election, as the 
estimated effect is close to zero for the window from year 1 to year 2. 
Focusing on the main event window from the election year to the year after, columns (4) 
to (6) follow Table 6 in treating different subsamples of politicians, similar to the samples in 
columns (3), (7), and (8) in Table 6, respectively (candidates from federal offices, from corporate 
environments, and from other backgrounds, respectively). Reassuringly,  we do not see any 
significant results in those subsamples, confirming the intuition that the effect on firm activities 
passes uniquely through the movement of politicians from state to federal offices. 
The examination of firm characteristics and activities by state, as shown in Tables 9 and 
10, thereby provides further evidence that certain firms benefit from political connections at 
state level more than others, and that such firms are more likely to move out of the state when 
                                                 
10 Changes in our measure of firm activities, calculated for the whole sample of all U.S. local newspapers, 
are highly correlated with changes in firm sales, investments, R&D, employment, and cash flows. These results, 
available upon request, suggest that our measure is a good proxy for firm activities at state level. 
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the favor is over. Taken together, the verifications of predictions 1 to 3 across Tables 6 to 10 
provide a wide array of support to the explanation that politicians bring more benefits to (certain 
kinds of) connected firms before, than they do after, elections to federal office. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates corporate benefits of political connections from the social 
network of directors and politicians. We use the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to 
identify the connection to a politician elected to the U.S. Congress in a closely contested race. 
The estimate of the Weighted Average Treatment Effect (WATE) during the period 2000 to 
2008 shows a negative and significant cumulative abnormal return of 2.65% surrounding the 
election date. The results are robust to various specifications, parametric and nonparametric, 
throughout different measures of outcome variables, with different definitions of social network, 
and across many subsamples. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we propose an internally valid 
identification strategy using the RDD of close elections that effectively deals with the 
endogenous nature of connected politicians. Our results are also externally valid, as the estimated 
WATE is averaged over the sample of all politicians susceptible to experience a close election. 
The external validity is further strengthened as firms in our sample are comparable to 
Compustat’s universe. 
Second, we find a negative estimated value of connection to U.S. congressmen. This 
apparently surprising estimate is consistent with an explanation that firms benefit more from 
political connections when the connected politician remains in state politics than when (s)he 
moves to the federal level. We empirically test several resulting predictions and find a wide range 
of evidence supporting our hypothesis. 
Overall, our study identifies the value of political connections through social networks in 
the United States and uncovers its variation across different states and between state and federal 
political environments. This remarkable gap in the value of connections calls for more attention 
and research on the theory and empirics of political connections and state-level institutional 
design. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
From Lee and Lemieux (2010), the Average Treatment Effect we estimate is defined and 
expressed as: 
ߚோ஽஽ ؝ lim௏௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘՝ହ଴%
ܧሺܥܣܴ௜|ܹ݅݊ሻ െ lim௏௢௧௘ௌ௛௔௥௘՛ହ଴%
ܧሺܥܣܴ௜|ܮ݋ݏ݁ሻ
ൌ ܧሺܥܣܴ௜ሺܹ݅݊ሻ െ ܥܣܴ௜ሺܮ݋ݏ݁ሻ|ܸ݋ݐ݄݁ܵܽݎ݁ ൌ 50%ሻ. 
This estimate is well identified under the assumption that the density of VoteShare, 
conditional on all characteristics of an observation, is continuous. Such assumption is warranted 
if the incidence of winning cannot be perfectly manipulated by candidates. Moreover, if we let 
the effect be heterogeneous across observations, i.e., ߚሺ ௜ܹሻ with ௜ܹ representing all observable 
and unobservable characteristics of each observation i, then the estimate can be rewritten as 
follows: 
ߚோ஽஽ ൌ නߚሺܹሻ
݂ሺ50%|ܹሻ
݂ሺ50%ሻ
݀ܩሺܹሻ, 
where ܩሺܹሻ is the cumulative distribution of W, ݂ሺݔሻ is the density of VoteShare, and 
the weight ௙ሺହ଴%|ௐሻ
௙ሺହ଴%ሻ
 represents the ex-ante likelihood of an observation with characteristics W to 
produce a close election. ߚோ஽஽ is thus a Weighted Average Treatment Effect across all possible 
observations. 
 
Figure 1 
Table D1 Summary Statistics 
 
A. Close Elections at 5%‐Vote Margin 
                          
  Senate    House of Reps.    Total 
Election Year  Number of Close Election 
Average 
Margin   
Number of 
Close Election 
Average 
Margin   
Number of 
Close Election 
Average 
Margin 
                 
2000  8  2.76%    18  2.28%    26  2.43% 
2002  4  2.03%    19  2.94%    23  2.79% 
2004  5  3.01%    10  2.92%    15  2.95% 
2006  3  1.83%    33  2.27%    36  2.23% 
2008  3  1.63%    25  2.74%    28  2.62% 
  23  2.42%    105  2.57%    128  2.54% 
 
 
B. Time Series (Biannual Observations, 2000‐2008) 
                       
   Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Q1  Q3  Stdev 
Elections per year  26  26  15  36  23  28  8 
  % of elections  5.45  5.51  3.21  7.68  4.93  5.94  1.62 
  % of reps  4.82  4.39  2.31  7.57  4.11  5.71  1.96 
  % of senators  13.64  11.76  9.09  23.53  9.09  14.71  6 
             
Politicians per year  89  84  61  112  82  108  21 
  % of elections  6.24  6.14  4.47  7.78  5.95  6.85  1.22 
  % of reps  4.87  4.99  2.18  7.21  4.39  5.60  1.84 
  % of senators  17.11  14.81  11.19  27.12  11.98  20.47  6.67 
             
Firms per year  362  372  200  588  260  392  149 
  % of stocks  4.97  4.63  2.89  8.39  3.57  5.40  2.14 
  % of total market value  13.09  11.79  8.12  20.99  10.97  13.60  4.84 
             
Academic institutions per year  49  50  32  71  40  54  15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Distribution of Degree and Graduation Years 
                    
Degree  Politicians  Directors 
Graduation 
Year  Politicians  Directors 
Business School  7.6% 4.6% <1950  3.6% 17.6% 
Medical School  0.4% 0.1% 1950‐59  4.8% 4.1% 
Graduate  6.8% 4.2% 1960‐69  21.2% 32.6% 
PhD  0.8% 0.7% 1970‐79  42.8% 32.6% 
Law School  9.6% 3.6% 1980‐89  20.0% 11.4% 
Undergraduate  74.8% 86.8% >=1990  7.6% 1.7% 
 
 
D. Firm Characteristics 
                                   
Sample     Compustat Universe 
   Min  Mean  Median  Max  SD     Min  Mean  Median  Max  SD 
Market Cap (in $ millions)  2.3  2048.9  379.1  58638.2  5341.7  0.0  2346.4  242.5  467092.9  11209.5 
Common Equity (in 
$ millions)  1.0  776.3  163.2  52817.0  2652.3  0.0  1014.0  121.3  224234.3  5540.5 
Market to Book Ratio  0.1  4.61  2.23  246.08  12.39  0.0  4.28  1.92  7071.35  59.17 
Capital Expenditure (in 
$ millions)  0.0  86.78  9.50  3023.0  274.88  0.0  147.09  6.85  31574.35  900.73 
Age  0.1  8.62  8.41  40.58  5.7     0.0  8.08  7.24  59.71  6.2 
Notes:  
(1) Corresponding Compustat universe includes all firms within Compustat in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. 
(2) Book value of equity<0, Capex<0, Share outstanding<0, Price at fiscal year end <0, Firm Age <0 are removed. 
 
 
Table 1: Main Estimations 
This  table  reports  the  main  pooled  OLS  regressions  of  the  Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  among  the  politically  connected  firms  around  close 
elections  for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a  firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second  in a 
close  election, who  furthermore  graduates  from  the  same  university  program within  a  year  (Cohen  et  al.  2008). Average  abnormal  returns  are 
estimated based on  the market model around  the election day  (Day 0). The market model  is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day  (‐315,‐61) 
period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the 
margin of votes between the top two candidates, with an x% margin referring to the subsample of elections with less than x% vote margin. Vote Share 
(Winners)  and Vote  Share  (Losers)  refer  to  the  vote  shares of winners  and  vote  shares of  losers,  respectively. Column  (3)  controls  for  a quartic 
polynomial  in vote share, separately for losers and winners. Column (4) controls for dummy variables representing party, gender,  incumbency and 
senate/house race information of the politician involved. Column (5) controls for firm's market value. Columns (6), (7) and (8) control respectively 
for fixed effects of years, SIC 2‐digit industries, and educational institutions. Column (9) excludes observations with CAR of 50% or higher. Standard 
errors  in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
               (1)                (2)                (3)             (4)               (5)                (6)                (7)                (8)                (9)    
Subsample  1% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  No Outliers 
                                     
Win/Lose  ‐0.0312    ‐0.0265    ‐0.0407    ‐0.0282    ‐0.0266    ‐0.0257    ‐0.0270    ‐0.0291    ‐0.0218   
  [0.00970]  **  [0.00853]  ***  [0.0137]  ***  [0.00873]  ***  [0.00857]  ***  [0.00835]  ***  [0.00926]  ***  [0.0110]  ***  [0.00758]  ** 
                              
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
No    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                                   
Controls          Full Poly   
Politician 
Variables   
Market 
Value    Year FE    Industry FE   School FE      
                                   
R‐squared  0.020    0.006    0.010    0.008    0.006    0.013    0.040    0.085   0.004   
Obs  316    1,819    1,819    1,817    1,819    1,819   1,804    2,066   1,806   
                                                        
Table 2 Alternative Specifications 
                     
This  table reports  the pooled OLS regressions of  the Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Standardized 
Cumulative  Abnormal  Returns  among  the  politically  connected  firms  around  close  elections  for  US 
Senate  and Congress  between  2000  and  2008  for  alternative  event  study windows. Each  observation 
pairs  a  firm’s  director  to  a  candidate  finishing  first  or  second  in  a  close  election,  who  furthermore 
graduates  from  the  same  university  program  within  a  year  (Cohen  et  al.  2008).  Average  abnormal 
returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is 
estimated using  daily  data  over  a  255‐day  (‐315,‐61)  period.  Standardized CAR  is CAR normalized  by 
volatility during the event period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician 
finishes  first or second  in an election. A close election  is specified by the margin of votes between the 
top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote 
shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected 
for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
                                      
  Dependent Variables: CAR            (1)           (2)            (3)         (4)           (5)         (6)    
Window  (‐7,‐1)  (‐1,0)  (‐1,5)  (0,5)  (1,5)  (6,20) 
                         
Win/Lose  0.00278    ‐0.00804    ‐0.0265    ‐0.0182    ‐0.0185    0.0139   
  [0.0162]    [0.00544]    [0.00853]  ***  [0.00947]  *  [0.00802]  **  [0.0220]   
                         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                         
R‐squared  0.004    0.003    0.006    0.005    0.005    0.002   
Obs  1,804    1,819    1,819    1,819    1,819    1,819                                         
 
Panel B: Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
                                      
  Dependent Variables: SCAR              (1)                (2)             (3)           (4)             (5)          (6)    
Window  (‐7,‐1)  (‐1,0)  (‐1,5)  (0,5)  (1,5)  (6,20) 
                         
Win/Lose  ‐0.100    ‐0.145    ‐0.322    ‐0.261    ‐0.290    0.0616   
  [0.181]    [0.136]    [0.125]  **  [0.143]  *  [0.129]  **  [0.142]   
                         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                         
R‐squared  0.011    0.004    0.005    0.004    0.004    0.000   
Obs  1,477    1,819    1,819    1,819    1,819    1,819                                         
Table 3 Nonparametric Tests 
                                         This table reports the nonparametric regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections 
for US  Senate  and Congress between  2000  and  2008. Each observation pairs  a  firm’s director  to  a  candidate  finishing  first or  second  in  a  close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based  on  the market model  around  the  election  day  (Day  0). The market model  is  estimated  using  daily  data  over  a  255‐day  (‐315,‐61)  period. 
Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. Each column consists of running a local 
cubic polynomial  regression of  the dependent  variable on  vote  shares  in  a  subsample  above  the  cutoff  and  a  subsample below  the  cutoff,  then 
calculating the difference between the predicted values of the dependent variable for each subsample around the cutoff. The first column shows the 
result for the realistic cutoff of 50%. Columns (2) to (5) show the results for different values of the bandwidth. Columns (6) to (9) show results with 
hypothetical cutoffs. Standard errors are in square brackets; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
  (1)       (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)       (6)     (7)     (8)     (9)       Benchmark    Robustness to Bandwidths    Placebo Thresholds 
Bandwidth  0.05    0.04  0.03  0.02  0.01                           
Cutoff  50%     50%  50%  50%  50%     48%  49%  51%  52% 
                                         
Win/Lose  ‐0.034      ‐0.034    ‐0.0342    ‐0.0345    ‐0.0387      0.0805    0.0128    0.0465    0.0234   
  [0.0168]  **    [0.0168]  **  [0.0167]  **  [0.0168]  **  [0.0180]  **    [0.0235]  ***  [0.0207]    [0.0283]    [0.0218]                                                                 
Table 4: Effects by Group 
This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections 
for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a  firm’s director  to a candidate  finishing  first or second  in a close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based on  the market model around  the election day  (Day 0). The market model  is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day  (‐315,‐61) period. 
Win/Lose  is a dummy variable equal to one  if and only  if a politician  finishes  first or second  in an election. A close election  is specified by  the 
margin of votes between  the  top  two candidates being  less  than 5%. Vote Share  (Winners) and Vote Share  (Losers)  refer  to  the vote shares of 
winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns (1) to (8) respectively show results on the subsamples of Senate or House races, incumbent 
or challenger candidates, democrats or republicans, and independent directors or executive directors. Columns (9) to (11) examine subsamples of 
connections through Harvard & Yale, and  institutions that are alma mater of  less or more than 50  individuals (sample's median)  in the sample. 
Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
   Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
               (1)               (2)               (3)               (4)               (5)                (6)                (7)               (8)               (9)               (10)              (11)    
Subsample  Senate  House  Incumbent  Challenger  Democrats  Republicans  Indep. Directors 
Exec. 
Directors 
Harvard & 
Yale 
Small 
Networks 
Large 
Networks 
                                             
Win/Lose  ‐0.0424    ‐0.0214    ‐0.0129    ‐0.0324    ‐0.0243    ‐0.0286    ‐0.0276    ‐0.0184    ‐0.0392    ‐0.0245    ‐0.0255   
  [0.0117]  ***  [0.0112]  *  [0.0145]    [0.0107]  ***  [0.0117]  **  [0.0137]  ** [0.00901] ***  [0.0210]   [0.00849] ***  [0.0113]  **  [0.00985]  ** 
                                             
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                                             
R‐squared  0.015    0.004    0.005    0.009    0.004    0.008    0.007    0.003    0.017    0.005    0.009   
Obs  559    1,260    598    1,221    1,057    762    1,493    326    449    1,092    727                                                                     
Table 5: Alumni Networks     
                                         
This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the alumni‐network politically connected firms around close 
elections for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second in a close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program without restriction on year of graduation (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal 
returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐
61) period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the 
margin of votes between the top two candidates, with an x% margin referring to the subsample of elections with less than x% vote margin. Vote Share 
(Winners)  and  Vote  Share  (Losers)  refer  to  the  vote  shares  of  winners  and  vote  shares  of  losers,  respectively.  Column  (3)  controls  for  a  quartic 
polynomial  in  vote  share,  separately  for  losers  and winners. Column  (4)  controls  for dummy  variables  representing party,  gender,  incumbency  and 
senate/house race information of the politician involved. Column (5) controls for firm's market value. Columns (6), (7) and (8) control respectively for 
fixed effects of years, SIC 2‐digit industries, and educational institutions. Column (9) excludes observations with CAR of 50% or higher. Column (10) runs 
a  local cubic polynomial regression of the dependent variable on vote shares  in a subsample above the cutoff and a subsample below the cutoff, then 
calculates  the  difference  between  the  predicted  values  of  the  dependent  variable  for  each  subsample  around  the  cutoff.  Standard  errors  in  square 
brackets  are  corrected  for  clustering  by  politicians  in  each  election,  except  in  column  (10) where  clustering  does  not matter.  *,  **  and  ***  denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                                            
               (1)                (2)                (3)                (4)                (5)                (6)                (7)                (8)                (9)               (10)    
Subsample  1% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  No Outliers  Non‐Param. 
                                         
Win/Lose  ‐0.0029    ‐0.0058    ‐0.0121    ‐0.0054    ‐0.0058    ‐0.0036    ‐0.0057    ‐0.0058    ‐0.0052    ‐0.0138   
  [0.0036]    [0.0028]  **  [0.0060]  **  [0.0024]  **  [0.0024]  **  [0.0027]    [0.0028]  **  [0.0034]  *  [0.0023]  **  [0.0042]  *** 
                                         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
No    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    ‐   
                                         
Controls          Full Poly   
Politician 
Variables   
Market 
Value    Year FE   
Industry 
FE    School FE       ‐   
                                         
R‐squared  0    0.001    0.001    0.001    0.001    0.012    0.017    0.015    0.001    ‐   
Obs  5,656    29,527    29,527    29,063    29,527    29,527    29,527    29,527    29,330    29,527                                                                 
Table 6: Tests by Politicians' Previous Experience     
                                 
This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections for 
US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second in a close election, 
who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated based on 
the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a 
dummy variable equal to one  if and only  if a politician  finishes first or second  in an election. A close election  is specified by the margin of votes 
between  the top  two candidates being  less  than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to  the vote shares of winners and vote 
shares of losers, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) consider samples of incumbents and election challengers. Columns (3) and (4) divide the sample 
of challengers into those with recent federal positions and the rest. Column (5) group all challengers with recent state level positions, and column 
(6)  limits  them  to  those  with  past  positions  in  state's  legislative  bodies  or  as  governors.  Column  (7)  considers  challengers  from  corporate 
environment, and column (8) considers the rest (non‐politician, non‐corporate backgrounds). Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for 
clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5)     
                   (1)             (2)          (3)            (4)          (5)            (6)            (7)              (8)    
Subsample  All Incumbents  All Challengers 
 Among Challengers  
From Federal 
Offices 
Not From 
Federal Offices 
From State 
Politics 
Top State 
Experience 
(House, 
Senate, Gov.) 
From Business  From Others 
                                 
Win/Lose  ‐0.0129    ‐0.0324    ‐0.00832    ‐0.0350    ‐0.0394    ‐0.0328    ‐0.0387    0.00518   
  [0.0145]    [0.0107]  ***  [0.0287]    [0.0104]  ***  [0.0282]    [0.0193]  *  [0.00840]  ***  [0.0288]   
                                 
Vote Share 
(Winners) 
and Vote 
Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                                 
R‐squared  0.005    0.009    0.007    0.011    0.007    0.010    0.011    0.093   
Obs  598    1,221    199    1,022    448    402    474    126                                                     
 
Table 7: Tests by Incumbents' Committee Membership     
                             
This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections for 
US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a firm’s director to an incumbent Congressman finishing first or second in 
a close election, who  furthermore graduates  from  the same university program within a year  (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are 
estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market model  is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) 
period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by 
the margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of 
winners  and  vote  shares  of  losers,  respectively.  Column  (1)  groups  all  incumbent  candidates.  Column  (2)  considers  only  members  of  the 
Appropriations Committee  in both chambers. Columns (3)  to (6) consider other groups of committees  in both chambers, respectively related  to 
natural resources and agriculture in (3), state, government and Congress affairs in (4), education, health, labor and sciences in (5), and economic, 
financial and budgetary  issues  in  (6)  (see appendix  for detailed classification). Column  (7) reports results  from senate committees, of which  the 
results for the subsamples of senators with committee seniority above and below 4 years are respectively reported in column (8) and (9). Column 
(10) shows results for house committees. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5)               (1)            (2)     (3)          (4)       (5)     (6)         (7)       (8)      (9)                  (10)   
Subsample  All incumbents 
In Both Houses 
Senate 
Committees 
Of Senate Committees   
House 
Committees Appropriations 
Comm.   
Resources & 
Agriculture  State Affairs 
Education, 
Health, 
Labor 
Economy & 
Budget 
Seniority > 
4    Seniority ≤ 4   
                                         
Win/Lose  ‐0.0113    0.0774    ‐0.00133    ‐0.0226    ‐0.00560    ‐0.0200    0.0859    0.104    ‐0.0555    ‐0.00999   
  [0.0145]    [0.0265]  **  [0.0158]    [0.0123]  *  [0.0532]    [0.0169]    [0.0170]  ***  [0.0279]  ***  [0.00264]  ***  [0.0184]   
                                         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                                         
R‐squared  0.008    0.026    0.005    0.016    0.003    0.011    0.016    0.019    0.081    0.004   
Obs  582    56    281    331    213    469    126    80    46    456   
Congressmen  70    10    30    25    23    54    11    7    4    59                                                              
Table 8: Variation by State's Regulation, Corruption and Institution Quality 
                             
This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically connected firms around close elections 
for US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. Each observation pairs a  firm’s director to a candidate finishing  first or second  in a close 
election, who furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Average abnormal returns are estimated 
based on  the market model around  the election day  (Day 0). The market model  is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. 
Win/Lose  is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the 
margin of votes between the top two candidates being  less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of 
winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns (1) to (10) respectively show results on the subsamples of  above of below median of the 
following measures: regulation score, corruption conviction rate in 2000 (Glaeser Saks 2006), Exalead.com 2009 search hits for “corruption” close 
to name of main city, normalized by hits for name of main city, Newslibrary.com 2009 all newspapers search hits for “corruption” close to name of 
state,  normalized  by  hits  for  name  of  state,  and GCISC  1970  score  (population  concentration  around  the  State  capital, Campante Do  2010). 
Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                                              
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5) 
               (1)               (2)                 (3)                (4)               (5)               (6)                 (7)                (8)                (9)             (10)    
Subsample  High Regulation 
Low 
Regulation 
More Corrupt 
Conviction Rate 
Less Corrupt 
Conviction 
Rate 
More Corrupt 
Main City 
Less 
Corrupt 
Main City 
More Corrupt 
State 
Less Corrupt 
State 
Low GCISC 
1970 
High GCISC 
1970 
                                         
Win/Lose  ‐0.0327    ‐0.0127    ‐0.0430    ‐0.0135    ‐0.0531    ‐0.00740    ‐0.0309    ‐0.0213    ‐0.0360    ‐0.0205   
  [0.0123]  ***  [0.0113]    [0.0132]  ***  [0.0113]    [0.0148]  ***  [0.0115]    [0.0125]  **  [0.0122]  *  [0.0136]  ***  [0.0110]  * 
                                         
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                                         
R‐squared  0.012    0.003    0.011    0.004    0.014    0.004    0.009    0.004    0.008    0.005   
Obs  1,166    653    852    967    872    947    1,081    738    914    905                                                                 
Table 9: Firm characteristics as determinants of the value of political connection 
This table reports the pooled OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns among the politically 
connected  firms  around  close  elections  for  US  Senate  and  Congress  between  2000  and  2008.  Each 
observation  pairs  a  firm’s  director  to  a  candidate  finishing  first  or  second  in  a  close  election,  who 
furthermore  graduates  from  the  same  university  program  within  a  year  (Cohen  et  al.  2008).  Average 
abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model around the election day (Day 0). The market 
model is estimated using daily data over a 255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to 
one  if and only  if a politician  finishes  first or  second  in an election. A  close election  is  specified by  the 
margin of votes between the top two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share 
(Losers)  refer  to  the  vote  shares  of  winners  and  vote  shares  of  losers,  respectively.  Columns  (1)  to  (4) 
respectively  show  results  on  the  subsamples  of  below  or  above  median  market  capitalization,  with  or 
without  reliance on external  finance  (Rajan and Zingales  1998). Column  (5) uses  the  subsample of  firms 
below  median  market  capitalization  and  with  reliance  on  external  finance.  Standard  errors  in  square 
brackets are corrected  for clustering by politicians  in each election. Column  (6)  refers  to  the  subsample 
with  the distance between  firm’s headquarter and politician’s State within  the  lowest quartile, and above 
median corruption score by Newslibrary search hits in politician’s State (see Table 6). Column (7) refers to 
the subsample with above median dependence on external finance and above median corruption score by 
Newslibrary search hits in politician’s State.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
  Dependent Variables: CAR (‐1,5)         
             (1)                (2)                (3)               (4)               (5)               (6)              (7)    
Subsample  Lower Market Cap 
Higher 
Market Cap 
Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Not Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Lower 
Market Cap, 
Rely on 
External 
Finance 
Short HQ 
Distance, 
More Corrupt 
Rely on 
External 
Finance, More 
Corrupt 
                             
Win/Lose  ‐0.0656    0.000202    ‐0.0299    ‐0.0217    ‐0.0564    ‐0.0718    ‐0.0377   
  [0.0197]  ***  [0.00911]    [0.0128]  **  [0.0148]    [0.0198]  ***  [0.0223]  ***  [0.0185]  ** 
                             
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
                             
R‐squared  0.023    0.004    0.010    0.004    0.025    0.034    0.015   
Obs  763    1,056    948    871    511    359    550                                               
Table 10: Firms Activities in States 
                               
This  table  reports  the  pooled  OLS  regressions  of  the  change  in  firm  activities  among  the  politically 
connected  firms  around  close  elections  for  US  Senate  and  Congress  between  2000  and  2008.  Each 
observation  pairs  a  firm’s  director  to  a  candidate  finishing  first  or  second  in  a  close  election,  who 
furthermore graduates from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). Firm activities 
in a given state in a given year are measured as "Firms Reported In Local Newspapers" (FRILN), the ratio of 
the number of search hits  for  the  firm's name  in  local newspapers and  the number of search hits  for  the 
neutral keyword "September". The dependant variable is the change of FRILN over different event windows, 
with year 0 being the election year. Win/Lose  is a dummy variable equal to one  if and only  if a politician 
finishes first or second in an election. A close election is specified by the margin of votes between the top 
two candidates being less than 5%. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of 
winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns (1) to (3) limit the sample to challengers with past 
positions in state's legislative bodies or as governors, respectively with windows of one year after, one year 
before, and two years after the election year. The samples in columns (4) to (6) are respectively challengers 
coming  from  federal  offices,  from  corporate  environment,  and  from  non‐political,  non‐corporate 
occupations. Standard errors in square brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Challengers with Top State Experience    
From 
Federal 
Offices 
   From Business    
From 
Others 
           (1)       (2)        (3)           (4)         (5)        (6)    
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change in 
Activities 
(0,+1)  (‐1,0)  (+1,+2)     (0,+1)     (0,+1)     (0,+1) 
                               
Win/Lose  ‐0.0154    ‐0.00148    ‐0.00152      ‐0.000822      ‐0.0102      ‐0.393   
  [0.00253]  ***  [0.00616]    [0.00764]      [0.00163]      [0.00635]      [0.435]   
                               
Vote Share 
(Winners) and 
Vote Share 
(Losers) 
Yes    Yes    Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes   
                               
R‐squared  0.009    0.013    0.000      0.014      0.012      0.016   
Obs  402    401    402      199      470      126                                                
Table A1: Further Robustness Checks 
This table reports robustness checks of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) among the politically connected firms around close elections for 
US Senate and Congress between 2000 and 2008. In columns (1) to (6) each observation pairs a firm’s director to a candidate finishing first or second 
in a close election, who  furthermore graduates  from the same university program within a year (Cohen et al. 2008). The outcome variable  is raw 
returns  from  the window  (‐1,5)  in columns  (1) and  (2), CARs calculated  from Fama‐French model  in columns  (3) and  (4), CARs calculated  from 
Fama‐French model with momentum in columns (5) and (6). Those models are estimated around the electionday (Day 0) using daily data over a 
255‐day (‐315,‐61) period. Win/Lose is a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a politician finishes first or second in an election. A close election 
is specified by the margin of votes between the top two candidates, with an x% margin referring to the subsample of elections with less than x% vote 
margin. Vote Share (Winners) and Vote Share (Losers) refer to the vote shares of winners and vote shares of losers, respectively. Columns (7)  to (9) 
collapse the data so that each unit of observation is respectively a director, a company, or a politician. In column (10) the benchmark regression in 
Table 1 is estimated with two‐way clustering of both Politician‐Year and Company‐Year (Cameron, Gelbach & Miller, 2011). Standard errors in square 
brackets are corrected for clustering by politicians in each election. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Dependent Var:   Raw Returns (‐1,5)  CAR(‐1,5) from FF  CAR(‐1,5) from FFM  CAR (‐1,5) 
                  (1)                 (2)                 (3)                   (4)                   (5)                   (6)                   (7)                   (8)                   (9)                  (10)    
Sample  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  5% margin  Director Level Company Level Politician Level Two‐way clustering 
                       Pol Year & Com Year 
                                
Win/Lose  ‐0.0204  ‐0.0445  ‐0.0228  ‐0.0248  ‐0.0261  ‐0.0270  ‐0.0306  ‐0.0287  ‐0.0271  ‐0.0261 
[0.0190]  [0.0211]  ** [0.00774] ***  [0.0101]  **  [0.00725]  ***  [0.00949]  ***  [0.00917]  ***  [0.00819]  ***  [0.0196]  [0.00759]  *** 
Vote Share (Winners) 
and Vote Share (Losers) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R‐squared  0.012  0.147  0.005  0.083  0.005  0.083  0.006  0.005  0.013  0.005 
Obs  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,819  1,818  1,818  1,308  1,593  192  1,818 
                                                              
 
